INTRODUCTION
In recent times the historiography of death has expanded considerably, but dead children have rarely been its central focus. 1 The same could be said of research in the history of children and youth. Though this field witnessed an early flourish of interest from demographic theorists and historians of the family in parental responses to early mortality, in the last few decades it has generally been haunted by the dead child's absence. 2 After the controversy surrounding Philippe Ariès's "parental indifference hypothesis" faded, historians of childhood prioritized efforts to uncover the values adult societies attached to "child life" or to recapture the agency of living children. This relative neglect of the dead child may owe something to the fact that death has been, statistically, in decline as an aspect of children's experience in modern times. As John
Gillis recently and pithily put it: "Two thirds of the longevity gains in the entire history of the human race have been attained in the last one hundred years." 3 Moreover, it is notable that those parts of the world that emerged in the late twentieth century as the heartlands of historical scholarship on childhood and youth were generally the same places in which this break with premodern patterns of child mortality had occurred earliest. Other more "intimate" considerations may also have stymied scholarly work in this area. As Magda Fahrni observes in this issue, extending research onto such a sensitive terrain leaves the historian of childhood exposed to allegations of a "ghoulish," "unseemly,"
or even "voyeuristic" fascination.
Though the stories of young people who failed to outlive childhood have largely been neglected in scholarly writing, child death certainly possessed vast social and cultural significance in modern times. As the contributors to this special issue show, even as death diminished as a central fact in children's lives during the twentieth century it continued to haunt the worlds of the living.
Premodern mortality rates of 30 to 40 percent dropped precipitously to around 5 percent by the middle of the last century, in more affluent societies at least.
But, even where mortality fell furthest and fastest, striking variations along fault lines of class, race, and space persisted in patterns of child death. And in many parts of the world, one in four children continued to die before age five well into the second half of the twentieth century. 4 The generally observed shift away from the grim, centuries-old threat of an early demise was also accompanied by wars, genocides, and deliberate programs of extermination that visited death upon children in unprecedented numbers.
While meanings of, and responses to, child death varied widely over time and space, this fact, this reversal of nature, remained a jarring facet of human experience across cultures. In different contexts, the deaths of children proved capable of provoking an array of powerful responses. They triggered challenges to Gods' sovereignty, debates over nation, law, labor, and culture, and contests over the meaning of public life, as well as of childhood itself. As the contributors to this volume show, the deaths of children lay at the heart of debates through which industrializing and urbanizing societies strove to understand and make What literary, visual, and aesthetic consequences did the "removal" of death from public view have for children? What difference did age make to the histories of dying, death, grief, mourning, and bereavement, and the relationships between these discrete subjects of study? The contributors to this in childhood. In considering recent work setting out broad shifts in attitudes to dead children in the last two centuries from public to more private expressions of grief and mourning, this article also examines the changing forms through which child death was represented to children (or not)-e.g., necropedagogies
and other literary and visual cultures produced for consumption by children.
SHOULD ANGELS DIE: CHILD DEATH, DEMOGRAPHY, AND THE DIVINE
In societies understood by contemporaries to be making a breathtakingly rapid transition to "modern-ness" in the 1800s, the persistence of child death often appeared as a brutal and worrisome fact. as evidence of a more highly evolved state. This belief, coupled with the notion that men were leaders of modern society (while women were the guardians of its traditions) ensured that public displays of grief at the death of children were not considered unmanly. The dead child could therefore become a focus of a shared public culture, and a middle-class-led consolatory oeuvre in which fathers as well as mothers played an important role. Such ideas drew upon perceptions of childhood as a repository of innocence, as a higher, less sinful state than adulthood. From this viewpoint, in which the coming of age was conceived of as a "fall from grace," child death could almost be seen in terms of merciful release. In the mid-to late nineteenth century, such thinking allowed the aesthetic of the uncorrupted dead child, whose soul was already in heaven, to take on new moral authority. As rising middle classes asserted their status and authority in these urban milieus, dead children emerged at the epicenter of the family in the so-called golden age of grief.
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The suggestion that certain shared ideas expressed using the shorthand of "civilization" began to cohere around the meaning of dead children, and the "correct" way to manage death rituals resonates with recent research challenging notions of a strict class divide within funerary culture. 15 Historians have critiqued the distinction between the "pauper" and the "respectable" burial as a rather too starkly drawn caricature and have pointed to the rise by the late nineteenth century of joint-stock cemeteries, insurance schemes, and burial club subscriptions to suggest that death rituals spread across class lines. In the late nineteenth-century United States, as Viviana Zelizer has shown, workingclass families rushed to pay into insurance schemes intended to enable them to provide if not a "good" then at least a "better" death for their children, as an alternative to the dreaded pauper burial. 16 In late nineteenth-and early twentieth-century London, those traveling on the "necropolis" lines shared the same carriages, and newer cemeteries disguised class. was because a heavier emotional investment was unjustified given the likelihood of children's early demise. As Ariès put it, the dead child "was thought that the little thing which had disappeared so soon in life was not worthy of remembrance: there were far too many children whose survival was problematical,"
and "the general feeling was, and for a long time remained, that one had several children in order to keep just a few." 19 Ariès also argued that, following the purported shift in attitudes toward childhood in the eighteenth century, children's growing visibility in nineteenth-century death culture reflected the desire (as Robert Woods has put it) to "express intense grief and passionate desire to make them survive. To exalt their innocence, charm and beauty." 20 Demographic theorists and historians of the family (loosely referred to as the "sentiments school"),
including Lawrence Stone, took their lead from Ariès's stimulating arguments, referring to extravagant Victorian-era mourning practices in support of claims that parental love was a distinguishing feature of the modern family. 21 From this perspective, premodern societies appeared to be places distinguished by abuse, suffering, and a comparative insensitivity to children's death.
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Ariès's "indifference hypothesis" did not go unchallenged. Focusing upon child life in Britain and America for example, Linda Pollock argued for the continuity of parental grief at child death. 23 Scholars studying grave architecture and the styles of American tombstones for children since the mid-seventeenth century also emphasized continuity. 24 Others, including Anthony Fletcher and Patricia Jalland, showed that the source base used in these earlier studies failed to convincingly underpin their arguments. 25 And much recent work has presented a quite different picture of premodern attitudes to child death, emphasizing parents' investment of sentimental value in their children's lives and underlining the profundity of feeling that their loss elicited. 26 This research has emphasized how in modern times poorer families continued to draw upon an array of premodern folk practices and traditions in order to deal with the trauma of child death, adapted and reinvented in modern, urban contexts. The resonance of aspects of such practices across cultures is also suggestive of the need for scholars to confront child death using approaches that are not only sensitive to local and regional differences but which also locate practices within a global history of interconnections and transnational practices that sometimes changed remarkably slowly.
The revisionist turn in scholarship examining the meanings that adults ascribed to dead children has exposed earlier positions as reductive by casting doubt upon any simple or direct correlation between mortality rates and affect.
More recently, however, scholars have again begun to question the precise mechanism through which the risk of premature death and death practices might have been connected. 27 This shift has been productive in that it has prompted historians to examine the extravagant outpourings of emotion over dead children in the Victorian era in a quite different light.
Scholars following up on such lines of inquiry have also recently begun to
give fuller consideration to the meanings that men of science ascribed to the dead child. Religious workers had long found projections of public grief over dead children a reassuring sign of parents' willingness to submit to God's will.
However, such convictions began to fade in the late nineteenth century. By the 1880s, leaders of liberal evangelical reform movements in Britain were urging elites to adopt more downscale mourning rituals in public. Those who failed to observe these revised codes, as Lydia Murdoch shows in this issue, came in for sharp criticism. This was partly a result of repugnance at the fact that "death services" had become so thoroughly colonized by commercial and professional agencies. But it is significant that spectacular displays of grief and mourning began to fade from public view around the same time as men of science were striving to render death knowable.
In the second half of the nineteenth century, ideals of progress had come to be associated with mechanistic theories of science triumphing over death. Annie, at the age of ten, was a watershed moment on his path toward theorizing evolution. Annie was Darwin's second child of ten, and one of three to die in childhood. 29 The precise effect of his daughter's death upon Darwin, his religious views, and subsequent work remains unclear. But for Patricia Jalland, the importance of Annie's death lay more in the fact that her father viewed his own dead child, even at the very moment of her death, not merely as a focus for grief, but also as a subject for "serious scientific reflection." Children's health emerged as a sign of parental competence and a marker of middle-class (and respectable working-class) identity. Child death by contrast emerged as a trauma against which children (and parents) were to be shielded at all costs. Consequently, memorial frameworks shifted. The earlier open and elaborate rituals of death that had served as a kind of social glue, binding adults and children together as active parts of family and community, had vanished.
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As child death became more knowable within the public spaces of scientific and media discourse, it also became more mysterious, in the sense of departing public life and becoming something considered properly the focus of private grief.
Sweeping death from living children's experiences of life became a key deliverable, not only of the modern nation state, but also the modern parent.
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This new sensibility contributed to a process whereby child death was being sequestered from public space and gradually (and, of course, incompletely) eliminated from public view. Scientific disciplines, not least the emergent field of psychiatry, provided evidence to support assumptions that it was especially important that child death be concealed from other children. Experts held that children were more vulnerable to emotion than adults owing to their supposedly inherent tendency toward imbalance. Proximity to death could be thus classed as the cause of a variety of pathologies from which children were "naturally" predisposed to suffer.
Beyond the realms of scientific discourse, literary cultures emerged to underpin new notions of interiority and serve the wider purpose of socializing children into new understandings of death. A key example was the modern fairy tale. Drawn upon traditional folk tales, these stories often recast children as associates of fairies. Children's presumed proximity to, and ability to communicate with, diminutive "fallen angels" reflected and reinforced the notion that they were themselves closer to the dead. In times past older siblings, grandparents, and members of the extended family had disciplined children through tales of malevolent spirits, or the "bogey man," as well as through didactic religious texts. The duty of inspiring fear of death in children to some extent produced the family as a social unit. However, the modern fairy tale was a sanitized version of older tales, and one generally divested of disciplining references to demonic agents abducting and exterminating the young. The new tales shifted mortal threats into a more euphemistic realm. But they also presented children with the responsibility to pore over questions of mortality quite independently, not through the Bible or other religious tracts, or adult intermediaries, but through "their own literature." This shift fit within a wider trend in postEnlightenment thinking that posited children as self-regulating subjects-to-be.
But it also reflected the tendency, following the nineteenth-century separation of work and private life and the more general stripping away of children's economic roles, to ascribe new responsibilities to young people within the home.
Literary products emerging from the commercial culture saturating children's lives presented readers with the expectation that they "master death" and the fear and feeling surrounding it.
This expectation endured across the twentieth century as growing access to cinema, radio, and television transformed popular culture and supplied a global audience of children with less heterogeneous sets of commercially generated texts. While day-to-day experiences of death for children continued to vary widely, in products such as cartoons and movies, death remained characteristically oblique. The millions of children who were able to access and participate in this burgeoning global culture-to join "Mickey Mouse Clubs," for example, and to visit cinemas-consumed cartoon characters who were in effect immortal. No matter how thoroughly belabored by their adversaries, these characters never died and went on to outlive multiple generations of young audiences.
The somewhat paradoxical assumption that children should somehow still master death even as they were protected from it meanwhile found other new forms of expression, notably in the scaling up of Halloween-seen in traditional societies as the day upon which the spirit world overlapped with that of the living-by the 1930s into what many considered a "children's holiday" in the United States and other Anglophone contexts.
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As the drive to preserve children against death gathered momentum in the first half of the twentieth century, it also served to bring different categories of dead children into sharper focus. Children who died at or before birth had often The same stillborn children who were denied entry into the afterlife had demographically older populations. It was in "ageing" societies such as Britain and France in the early twentieth century that states began to take a closer interest in vital registration (and malpractice) and endowed stillborn children with a legal existence. As societal awareness of the infant as a separate medical and social entity grew in England, stillbirth registration was introduced. 39 As Karen
George explains in this special issue, a specific register recording information about the death of children in care in Australia, the Mortality Record Book, was also introduced from 1927. 40 While Philippe Ariès and Geoffrey Gorer characterized the twentieth century as a period during which death was removed from public view, others have argued, to the contrary, that in this period it was recognized in places and ways that it had not been previously. As Tony Walter and Lindsay Prior have observed, it was discussed in a different kind of (legal and medical) language, notably in relation to children.
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The surprising decline in infant mortality in the early twentieth century followed improvements in nutrition, the control of infectious disease, medi- used demographic strategies such as infanticide served imperial ambitions by denoting un-modernness and "incivility." But in the interwar age of "trusteeship," preserving the children of colonial subject peoples against early death increasingly came to be seen as a core deliverable of empire (especially as imperial governments faced a rising tide of indigenous nationalism). 43 In places where high levels of infant mortality persisted, dead children posed a direct threat to colonial overlords' pursuit of stability and their claims to represent civility and benevolence. to 1947, an estimated 88 percent (some 659,871) were children. 45 Though child death remained an obvious and highly public fact of urban life in Shanghai,
Henriot suggests it also remained, in a sense, "invisible." As he put it, this phenomenon "was so massive, so present in everyday life, and probably so unbearable that it became something they chose not to see or to care about, except when a dead body landed on their doorstep. Through a double process of social denial . . . these invisible deaths were pushed out of collective memory."
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A key consequence of the spread of new technologies across the globe in the early twentieth century was that the principal causes of child death began to change. Before 1900, infectious disease such as pneumonia, diphtheria, tuberculosis, and scarlet fever had killed around half of all infants in the United States, for example. 47 But as improvements in urban sanitation reduced these figures, chronic and degenerative diseases took a much greater toll on children, especially those who were older. Soon, in more developed societies, child mortality was redefined in relation not to disease but to accidental death, the prime cause of which was motor traffic accidents.
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The proliferation of motor vehicles in urban centers during the first half of the twentieth century led to automobiles being identified as the primary threat to child life. By the 1910s, accidents in which children were crushed beneath the wheels of motor vehicles had replaced disease as the leading cause of death in the United States for children in the five-to-fourteen age bracket. French provincial newspapers, already fretting over "de-population," devoted substantial amounts of space to coverage of this growing threat. In a period marked more broadly by anxieties over the demographic impact of war, beyond streets and broadsheets the daily erasure of young lives by motor vehicles stimulated a critique of (auto)mobility. The main consequence of this, however, appears to have been a marked shift in understandings of children's public mobility.
Those in authority increasingly identified the public presence of young people as a "problem" to be solved. By the 1930s, acknowledgment of this led to the appointment of "safety councils" in wealthier nation-states. 49 Children's urban lives more generally were recast in terms of endangerment. By the second half of the twentieth century, with reference to the case of Britain, the sociologist Gill Valentine has argued that the child in public had become a quite anomalous figure.
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While the growing threat of death by automobile cast a pall over children's public lives, specific spaces, streets, and workspaces and places of commercial leisure continued to be construed as dangerous to children. Accidents in commercial places reinforced associations of children's movement beyond the home with the lurking danger of death, and exposed conflicting views over questions of responsibility for them. As Magda Fahrni shows in this issue, the deaths of seventy-eight children in the Laurier Palace cinema fire, which convulsed the Both Fahrni's and Jones's articles return us to the question of children's agency by illustrating how young people's actions made them contributors to a societal dialog over death. In the case of the suicides at Whittier school, these children's apparently rational choice of death challenged assumptions that as children they were understood to be non-rational actors. As populist counternarratives grew up in the wake of these shocking events, those determined to defend state-level interests struggled to find ways to shift the blame onto supposedly innocent victims. In fashioning a response to the suicides, experts therefore marshalled narratives highlighting the young victims' supposedly unbalanced mental state. State authorities also ranged themselves behind demands for new and ever more specialized subdivisions of institutional space.
These they deemed necessary to accommodating "defectives" and "delinquents" who were a danger both to themselves and to the larger communities of which they formed part.
These tragedies, like that of the Hochelaga fire, reveal how quickly children's deaths could act as an emotional trigger, exceeding the meanings those in authority preferred to ascribe to them. And they also showed (in both cases)
how the agency of children could have remarkable, posthumous consequences.
In the hands of adults, children's untimely deaths could powerfully symbolize inequality. Even in places where children had not yet become entirely economically worthless, they could represent the "failed promises" of industrial capitalism with considerable potency. The legacy of children's actions, though far from undisputed, also provided communities with resources enabling them to challenge vested interests and social barriers. And, it was precisely because child death elicited a sense of "collective failure" and of a tragedy for society, as
Fahrni puts it, that the sense of child life cut short could trigger such extraordinary debates over how to live.
As children's lives in public spaces came to be construed as being in danger, this reinforced assumptions that the home-the site of the ideally happy childhood-might exist as a place of safety, a refuge from deadly encounters.
However, on closer inspection, homes turned out to be spaces where, statistically, the emotionally priceless child was more and not less likely to be the victim of a fatal accident. 52 As deaths at an early age became more rare, parents grappled with expectations that they take seriously the responsibility to "child proof" their homes. This process involved a minute subdivision of private space, or perhaps the further "islanding" of childhood within the family home. 53 While parents finessed from the domestic picture the threats lurking at home in such mundane forms as stairs, electric sockets, and blind cords, they assigned a participatory role to older children in this process. Parents (and children's storybooks) counselled young people on how to navigate the dangers of their own homes.
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Even as dangers of death in the suitably "childproofed" home receded, the visualized threat of violent death, if not the physical experience of it, remained integral to the socialization of the child in private. As Tamara Myers shows in this issue, from the mid-twentieth century media technology exposed children to the imagery of death in new didactic forms. The dead child burst emphatically back into children's lives, across cultures from the 1950s through the medium of public information films. These films ruptured the boundaries between public and private by delivering images of child death. The intention in doing so was to shock young audiences observing the films within the "safety" of their own homes into conforming to certain practices beyond it.
In some respects, these films revived a long tradition of cautionary tales.
They reconnected children with what Ann Pellegrini has referred to as "necropedagogies": stories about death invested with pedagogical intent.
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Older stories of children's deaths had provided families in Europe and America with models of religious piety and civic virtue, in effect ways of living. Their role was to teach children how to manage the powerful emotions associated with the possibility of their own death, and that of other children. 55 However,
as we have seen in the previous half century, experts in the inner workings of the human mind had undermined convictions that death should serve as a disciplinary tool in children's lives, and knowledge of it had faded from the disciplinary narratives that defined community relations.
In the mid-twentieth century modern states revived necropedagogies, "judi- death in public to didactically instill good behavior. These state-produced films associated danger and death with specific public places, notably roadways, railways, and substations-the architectures of high modernity. By informing children about the dangers of spaces associated with speed, transience, and mobility, state media undergirded older cultural assumptions about childhood as a site upon which tradition, nostalgia, and pastness were ideally to be inscribed.
These assumptions had profound implications for the kinds of "childness" that authorities expected might be performed in public, and by extension attitudes toward citizenship. 57 Though necropedagogies were intended to produce public, self-governing, rational individuals by relying heavily upon their ability to shock, these mediatized visions of death threatened to undermine the very notion of a public space for children altogether.
The "didactic sudden death" films proliferated in a period described by David Cannadine as one of "total immersion in death of a new kind." 58 In the nuclear era, global death had become an ever-present possibility. The films created landscapes of childhood fear, threatened by transport and electricity networks, but appear to have hinted at deeper anxieties surrounding more powerful (weaponized) technologies and the complete inability of even the most powerful states to protect "priceless" children against them. Meanwhile, the willingness of governments to deliver unsentimental images of dead children to audiences, a significant number of whom were children, shattered the very dichotomy between "safe" private and "dangerous" public space that these interventions were intended to shore up. By the very fact of being screened within domestic environments, the films revealed the home not as a sanctuary but as a porous place, invaded and disrupted by the punitive or didactic tactics of police, educators, and experts. The "private" realm was a space invaded by the fear of death, if not death itself.
Nowhere was the porosity of the home clearer than in the midst of the social jeopardy of war. War in the twentieth century has often been discussed as strikingly different to the genres of conflict that preceded it, in terms of its scale and its tendency to expose civilian populations to combat. But what also distinguished modern warfare was that it revealed the gulf between ideals of a protected childhood and the grim reality "on the ground." In her best-selling book of 1900 (translated into English in 1909), Ellen Key predicted that the twentieth century would be the "Century of the Child." In the decades that followed, the recognition of childhood as an emotionally priceless condition reached unparalleled heights, global reach, and institutional backing, and modern states contributed to processes that saved more children than ever before in human history. However, the same period was also marked by wars and manmade catastrophes that brought millions of children face to face with the shocking fragility of their own supposedly "special" status.
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War occasioned, or gave rise to, state-led campaigns calculated to deliver death on a scale that was unprecedented. Children's deaths were often not merely the result of accidental exposure in the midst of conflict, but were pursued quite delib- 
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